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QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
FOR FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
THE NEED FOR A NEW
DEFINITION OF "DOING
BUSINESS" BASED ON IN-STATE
SALES VOLUME

All states require foreign corporations 1 to register with state
authorities before they may carry on business in the state. 2
These qualifications3 statutes require that corporations "doing
business"• in the state must pay licensing fees, report certain
information, or submit to other forms of regulation. The statutory definition of "doing business," 11 therefore, is important to
' A corporation doing business in one state though chartered or incorporated in another state is a "foreign" corporation as to the first state. 17 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 8290 (1977) (hereinafter FLETCHER).
• Many states have separate but similar registration requirements for non-profit corporations. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 163a66 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
• "Qualification" is distinct from "domestication." Qualification refers to the licensing
or regulation of a foreign corporation without an attempt to change its status. Domestication is sometimes synonymous with qualification. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1.201 (West 1951). Domestication, however, sometimes refers to the re-incorporation of
a foreign corporation which is available as an alternative to qualification. See, e.g., NEB.
REV. STAT. § 21-20.122 (1943).
• "Doing Business" is the expression utilized in the statutes of many states. See, e.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7301 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 1301 (McKinney Supp. 197879). Section 106 of the MODEL BusINESS CORPORATION ACT and other statutes use the
term "transacting business." See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-397 (1958); GA. CODE ANN.
§. 22-1401(b) (1977). A variety of other expressions are used in qualification statutes:
"engaging in business," see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10-2-250, § 90(a) (1977); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1.199 (1951); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-8-2 (1967); "carrying on
business," see, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT.§ 174-7.5 (1976); "commencing business," see, e.g.,
NEV. REV. STAT. § 80.010 (1977); "conducting affairs," see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 481101 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-49 (Supp. 1979).
Courts are divided over the question of whether the expressions "doing business" and
"transacting business" are equivalent. Compare General Conference of Free Baptists v.
Berkey, 156 Cal. 466, 105 P. 411 (1909) and Griffin v. Implement Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 62 N.D. 21, 241 N.W. 75 (1932) (same meaning) with People v. Montreal & B. Copper Co., 40 Misc. 282, 81 N.Y.S. 974 (Sup. Ct. 1903) and S.R. Smythe Co. v. Forth Worth
Glass & Sand Co., 105 Tex. 8, 142 S.W. 1157 (1912) and Nagle Motors, Inc. v. Volkswagen N. Cent. Distrib., Inc., 51 Wis. 2d 413, 187 N.W.2d 374 (1971) (different
meanings).
• The issue of the level of contacts necessary to constitute "doing business" for qualification purposes should not be confused with the separate questions of the level of con-
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entrepreneurs whose operations affect states other than their
home state, or who are considering expanding their business to
other states. Efficient marketing decisions require that the statutory definition of "doing business" be susceptible to easy and
precise determination. The definitions of "doing business" in
present statutes, however, make it impossible in many situations
to decide whether a corporation is "doing business" in a foreign
state. Imposing qualification requirements under these uncertain
conditions makes business decisions to expand into other states
unnecessarily difficult.
A change in existing model legislation is needed to remedy the
ambiguity and uncertainty of current law. Part I of this article
examines the mechanics of the present qualification system, paying special attention to the problems created by a multiplicity of
vague state standards. Part II discusses the historical justification and purposes of the present system, concluding that only
the protection function justifies the continued existence of the
system. Finally, Part III proposes that "doing business" be defined in terms of the annual volume of in-state sales. This solution would remedy the problems which plague the present system while furthering the legitimate protection function of the
state qualification requirements.

I. THE

PRESENT SYSTEM

Present state qualification statutes often fail to indicate
clearly whether a foreign corporation must qualify. The decision
whether or not to qualify, moreover, involves considerable risk: a
court may later determine that the corporation in fact conducted business in the state, and thus impose sanctions.

A.

The Mechanics of Qualification: Procedures and Penalties

Section 106 of the Model Business Corporations Act6 (MBCA)
provides that a corporation shall not have the right to transact
business7 in the state until it procures a certificate of authority
from the Secretary of State. MBCA Section 106 does not define
tact necessary for either the assertion of personal jurisdiction, or for the imposition of
taxes by a state. See note 60 and accompanying text infra (qualification and personal
jurisdiction); note 68 and accompanying text infra (qualification and taxation). , ,
• 2 MODEL BuslNESs CORPORATION ACT § 106, (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1977).
• See note 4 supra.
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"transacting business," but does provide a "safe harbor": a nonexclusive list of business activities which, alone or together, do
not constitute transacting business in the state. 8 Even in the
states which have adopted section 1069 , business activities not
listed in the safe harbor provision present a major source of uncertainty. Most states, however, have either failed to adopt the
"safe harbor" section without alteration or decided to omit it
altogether. 10 Thus, the resolution of many qualification cases de• The second paragraph of MBCA § 106 states:
Without excluding other activities which may not constitute transacting business
in this State, a foreign corporation shall not be considered to be transacting business in this State, for the purposes of this Act, by reason of carrying on in this
State any one or more of the following activities:
(a) Maintaining or defending any action or suit or any administrative or arbitration proceeding, or effecting the settlement thereof or the settlement of claims or
disputes.
(b) Holding meetings of its directors or shareholders or carrying on other activities concerning its internal affairs.
(c) Maintaining bank accounts.
(d) Maintaining offices or agencies for the transfer, exchange and registration of
its securities, or appointing and maintaining trustees or depositories with relation to its securities.
(e) Effecting sales through independent contractors.
(0 Soliciting or procuring orders, whether by mail or through employees or
agents or otherwise, where such orders require acceptance, without this State
before becoming binding contracts.
(g) Creating evidences of debt, mortgages or liens, on real or personal property.
(Changed in 1973 to read: Creating as borrower or lender, or acquiring indebtedness or mortgages or other security interests in real or personal property.)
(h) Securing or collecting debts or enforcing any rights in property securing the
same.
(i) Transacting any business in interstate commerce.
(j) Conducting an isolated transaction completed within a period of thirty days
and not in the course of a number of repeated transactions of a like nature.
2 MooEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 106, 2d Par. ~ 1 (1971 & Supp. 1977).
• Among the states with definitions not modeled after MBCA § 106, several employ an
abbreviated list of activities: ALA. CODE §§ 10-2-250, 10-2-256, 10-2-273 (1977); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 371, 373 (Supp. 1978); D.C. CooE ANN. § 29-933 (1973); KAN. S-iAT.
ANN.§ 17-7303 (1974); OHIO REV. CooE ANN.§§ 1703.02, 1703.03 (Page 1978); NEv. REV.
STAT. §§ 80.010, 80.240 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2101 (1973).
The definitions in the other states employ no list at all: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1201
(Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (Smith-Hurd 1954); IND. CODE. ANN. § 231-11-1 (Burns Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303-03 (West 1969); N.H. STAT. ANN.
§ 300:3 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.199 (West 1953); S.D. COMP. LAWS
ANN.§ 47-8-1 (1967); VA. CooE § 13.1-102.1 (1978); Wvo. STAT. ANN.§ 17-1-701 (1977).
10
Statutory definitions modeled after MBCA § 106 include the following: ALASKA
STAT. § 10.05.600 (1968); AR1z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-106 (West 1956); CAL. CORP. CODE
ANN. § 2105 (Deering Supp. 1980); COLO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-101 (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 33-397 (West 1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.304 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 22-1401 (1977); HAW. REv. STAT. § 418-6 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-106 (Supp. 1980);
lowA CODE ANN. § 496A.103 (West Supp. 1980-81); Kv. REv. STAT. § 271A.520 (Supp.
1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:302 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A,
§ 1201 (West. 1964 & Supp. 1980); Mo. CoRP. & Ass'Ns CooE ANN. § 7-103 (1980-81);
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pends upon judicial construction of "doing business" or similar
phrases. 11
State qualifications impose upon a business both direct and
indirect costs. First, foreign corporation laws typically provide
for a fee to be paid when applying for a certificate of authority
to do business. In some states, this is a flat "filing fee."u Other
states impose a "license fee" based upon the amount of the corporation's capital located in the state. 18 Second, state qualification schemes often impose annual taxes. Some of these assessments are referred to as "license fees" and are generally fixed in
amount. 14 Others are labeled "franchise taxes"; these assessMASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 181, § 3 (Michie/Law Co-op 1977); M1cH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200
(1012) (Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-211 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.570
(Vernon Supp. 1980); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 35-1-1002 (Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 21.20,105 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:13-3 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-17-1
(1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 1301 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55131 (1975 & Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-22-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.655
(1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2001 (Purdon 1967 Supp. 1980-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 71.1-117 (1969); S.C. CODE § 33-23-10 (1976); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 48-1101 (1979); TEx.
Bus. CoRP. ACT. ANN. art. 8.01 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-102 (1973);
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.32.010 (Supp. 1980-81); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-49 (Supp.
1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.801 (4) (West Supp. 1980-81). But see KAN. STAT. ANN. §
17-7301 (1974) (Gives a list of three activities which do constitute "transacting business"
in addition to a list of activities which do not constitute "transacting business").
The categories of business activities enumerated in MBCA § 106 are representative of
the safe harbor activities established in pre-MBCA judicial and legislative decisions. 2
MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. § 106, 2d Par. ,r 2 (2d ed. 1971) (Official Comment to § 106,
2d Par.). The following states have adopted the entire list of activities in MBCA § 106;
ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.600 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.304 (West 1977); HAW. REv.
STAT. § 418-6 (1976); lowA CODE ANN. § 496A.103 (West Supp. 1980); KY. REv. STAT.
§ 271A.520 (Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 21-20,105 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-1
(1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-22-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.655 (1977); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 2001 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-1.1-117 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 16-10-102 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.32.010 (1969).
11
See note 4 supra. See. also CT. CORPORATION SYSTEM, WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING
BUSINESS (1976) (grouping the holdings in the various states by type of business activity
involved); Barrett, Advising a Corporation "Doing Business" in Other States, 19 PRACTICAL LAw. 85 (April 1973) (dealing with the types of activity to be avoided in order to
avoid qualification).
11
See, e.g., MBCA § 128(n); IDAHO CoDE § 30-l-128(k) (Supp. 1980). Although California imposes a filing fee of $350, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12211 (Deering Supp. 1980), most
filing fees range between $10 and $100. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-129(3) (1977)
($50); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-10-104(1)(e)(I) (Supp. 1979) ($100); M1cH. STAT. ANN. §
21.200(1060)(b) (Supp. 1979) ($10).
•• See, e.g., MBCA § 131; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.367 (West 1977). License fees typically are assessed in an amount which is dependent upon the amount of capital employed in the state. E.g., MBCA § 131; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.367 (West 1977) (number
of authorized shares); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1210(1) (Supp. 1977) (par value of authorized shares). Most fee schedules are regressive. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.367 (West
1977). Some set a minimum fee, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.708 (1978); others set a maximum fee, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. 79-3-755 (1972).
" See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-405 (Supp. 1980).
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men ts are sometimes based upon income 111 or fixed in amount, 18
although most are computed upon some measure of the capital
employed in the state. 17 Third, the statutes typically require a
foreign corporation to furnish certain information in the application for a certificate. 18 Qualification statutes, therefore, cause
foreign corporations to incur the costs of complying with reporting requirements. Moreover, states commonly require the filing
of an annual report with the Secretary of State. 19 Although these
costs are not substantial for larger corporations, they are a factor
to be considered in the decision of whether or not to qualify to
do business in a state.
State qualification schemes are enforced primarily by imposing sanctions on corporations who fail to comply. Denial of access to the state's court system is one of the most prevalent
techniques. The statutes of all fifty states and the District of
Columbia disable nonqualified corporations from bringing suit.
In forty-eight jurisdictions, an unqualified foreign corporation is
forbidden to maintain any action in the courts;20 three states
'" See,
See,
17
See,
worth).
•• See,
11

10

e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1-130 (West Supp 1980).
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.615 (1968).
e.g., MBCA § 133 (stated capital); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-2401 (Supp. 1979) (net

e.g., MBCA § 110.
See, e.g., MBCA § 125.

ao MBCA § 124 states that "[n]o foreign corporation transacting business in this State
without a certificate of authority shall be permitted to maintain any action, suit or proceeding in any court of this State, until such corporation shall have obtained a certificate
of authority." 2 MooEL Bus. CoRP. Ac:r ANN. 2d § 124, 11 1 (1971). States which forbid a
violating corporation to bring any action include: ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.690 (1968); AR1z.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-124 (West 1956); CAL. CoRP. CooE ANN. § 2203 (Deering 1947);
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-9-103 (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-412 (Supp. 1979); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 383 (Supp. 1978); D.C. Coo ANN. § 29-934f (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.354 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CooE ANN. § 22-1421 (1977); HAw. REv. STAT. §
418-13 (1980); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-124 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE § 23-1-11-14 (Supp. 1979); lowA CooE ANN. §
496A.120 (West Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7307 (1974); Kv. REv. STAT. §
271A.610 (Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:314 (West Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1214 (1964); Mo. CoRP. & Ass'Ns. CooE ANN.§ 7-301 (1975); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 181, § 9 (Michie/Law Co-op 1977); M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.2051 (1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.20 (West 1969); Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-3-247 (1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 351.635 (Vernon Supp. 1979); MoNT. CooES ANN. § 15-22-117 (1967); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 21-20,121 (1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 80.210 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 300:8
(1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A-13-11 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20 (1978);
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1312 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154 (1975); N.D.
CENT. CooE § 10-22-19 (1976); OHIO REv. CooE ANN. § 1703.29 (Page 1978); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1.201 (West 1951); Oa. REv. STAT. § 57.745 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
2014 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-117 (1970); S.C. CooE § 33-23-150 (1977);
S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 47-8-30 (1967); TENN. CooE ANN. § 48-1106 (1979); TEx.
Bus. CoRP. Ac:r. ANN. art. 8.18 (Vernon 1956); UTAH CooE ANN. § 16-10-120 (1973); VA.
CODE§ 13.1-119 (1978); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 23A.32.190 (1969); w. VA. CODE§ 31-1-
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forbid the corporation to bring actions to enforce contracts.11
The disability to sue extends to suits brought in the federal
courts, 22 and usually extends to successors and assignees of the
unqualified corporation. 18 Subsequent qualification may cure the
66 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.847 (West. Supp. 1980); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §17-1-719
(1977).
11
ALA. CODE § 10-2-254 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 2120 (1973).
11
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). But see Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: Re-examining Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. and Reopening the Federal Courts, 48 N.C. L. REv. 56 (1969).
There is, however, no disability to sue where jurisdiction is based upon the existence of
a federal question. Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs,
439 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); American Export Lines,
Inc. v. J & J Distrib. Co., 452 F. Supp. 1160 (D.N.J. 1978).
•• MBCA § 124 extends the disability to "any successor or assignee" of the unqualified
corporation. 2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 2d § 124, 11 1 (1971). The following states
extend the disability to the same or similar persons: ALA. ConE § 10-2-254 (1975) (persons claiming through or under the contract); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.690 (1968); AR1z.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-124 (West 1956); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-412 (West Supp.
1979); D.C. ConE ANN. § 29-934f (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.354 (West 1977); GA.
ConE ANN. § 22-1421 (1977); IDAHO ConE § 30-1-124 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 157.125 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); low A ConE ANN. § 496A.120 (West Supp. 1979); Kv.
REv. STAT. § 271A.610 (Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A § 1214 (West 1964)
(no disability for subrogees); Mn. CoRP. & Ass'Ns ConE ANN. § 7-301 (1975) (any person
claiming under the contract); M1cH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200 (1051) (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 303.20 (West 1969) (holder in due course doctrine not altered); Miss. ConE ANN. § 793-247 (1972);.MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 35-1-1004 (1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-20,121
(1943); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A-13-ll (West 1969) (holder in due course doctrine not altered); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20 (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1312 (McKinney
1963) (any successor in interest); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154 (1975); N.D. CENT. ConE § 1022-19 (1976); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.201 (West 1951); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.745
(1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2014 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 7-1.1-117 (1969);
S.C. ConE § 33-23-150 (1976) (no disability for subrogees); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §
47-8-30 (1976); TENN. ConE ANN. § 48-1106 (1979); Tux. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18
(Vernon 1956) (holder in due course doctrine not altered); UTAH ConE ANN. § 16-10-120
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2120 (1973) (assignee and any person claiming under
such assignee or corporation); WASH REv. ConE ANN. § 23A.32.190 (1976); W. VA. ConE
§ 31-1-66 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 180.847 (West Supp. 1980); Wvo. STAT. ANN.§ 17-1719 (1977).
The statutes in the following states provide that the disability does not extend to assignees: DEL ConE ANN. tit. 8, § 383 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7307 (1974).
The statutes in the remaining states do not indicate whether the disability to sue extends to assignees, leaving the courts to decide the question.
Courts are divided over whether the prohibition extends to counterclaims. Compare
Moore v. Northern Homes of Pa., Inc., 80 F.R.D. 278 (W.D. Va. 1978) and Levitt Multihousing Corp. v. District Court, 188 Colo. 360, 534 P.2d 1207 (1975) and Gibraltar
Const. and Eng'r, Inc. v. State Nat'! Bank of Bethesda, 265 Md. 530, 290 A.2d 789 (1972)
and Bozzuto's Inc. v. Frank Kantrowitz & Sons, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 146, 283 A.2d 907
(1971) (disability to sue applies to counterclaims) with Park v. Cannco Contractors, Inc.,
446 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Miss. 1977) and Aberle Hosiery Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n,
337 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1972) and Burley Newspapers, Inc. v. Mist Publishing Co., 414
P.2d 460 (Id. 1966) (disability to sue does not apply to counterclaims) and State v. Cook
United, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), modified, 469 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.
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disability to sue: only four states completely bar causes of action
accruing before qualification. 24 Where qualification does cure the
disability to sue, the corporation may have to complete the procedure prior to the commencement of the action in order to
avoid a dismissal without prejudice; 211 in some states, however,
courts allow corporations to qualify during trial or at any time
prior to the entry of a final judgment.26
The effects of a disability to sue may be severe. In two circumstances, the curable denial of access may have the same impact
as a dismissal of the action with prejudice. First, in states where
later filing of an action does not relate back to the date of the
original filing, 27 the statute of limitations may run on the corporation before it qualifies/as Second, if the failure to qualify is not
raised initially as a defense, the corporation may be barred
before it ever learns of the need to qualify. Even dismissal without prejudice may have economic costs. Corporate agents will
weigh the benefits of access to the courts against the costs of
qualification. The value of the benefits would be the expected
value of recovery in the instant suit and all future suits to be
brought in that state. 29 If costs outweigh these benefits of qualification, corporate agents would not continue a suit after failure
1971). The statutory language of two states appears to prohibit an unqualified corporation from even defending a suit. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 80.210 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
180.847 (West Supp. 1980). The courts of both states, however, have held otherwise. See
Scott v. Day-Bristol Consol. Mining Co., 37 Nev. 299, 142 P. 625 (1914) (bringing suit
constitutes implied waiver of claim of inability to defend); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 52
Wis. 2d 325, 190 N.W.2d 521 (1971) (prohibition is limited to counterclaims) .
.. See ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 10.2-254 (1975) (contracts are "void," but the foreign corporation is "estopped from setting up the fact that the contract or agreement was so made
in violation of law"); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (1966) (contracts are unenforceable);
Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-247 (1972) (modified version of MBCA § 124); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2120 (1973) (contracts are unenforceable).
Statutory provisions identical to MBCA § 124 would appear to allow subsequent qualification to cure the disability to sue. See note 23 supra. But see Thomas Indus., Inc. v.
Wells, 403 Mich. 466, 472, 270 N.W.2d 98, 101 (1978) (despite statutory language identical to MBCA § 124, the disability to sue may not be curable).
•• See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 22-1421 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154 (1975).
11
See, e.g., Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977);
Typh, Inc. v. Typhoon Fence, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Rigid Component
Sys. v. Nebraska Component Sys., Inc., 202 Neb. 658, 276 N.W.2d 659 (1979); Lawler v.
Ginochio, 584 P.2d 667 (Nev. 1978); Grow Farms Corp. v. National State Bank, Elizabeth, 167 N.J. Super. 102, 400 A.2d 535 (1979).
17
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitations of Actions § 224 (1970).
•• See, e.g., Kitchen v. Himelfarb, 254 A.2d 694 (Md. App. 1969) (six-month statute of
limitations for filing of mechanics' lien claim ran before re-filing). The likelihood of such
an occurrence is greater in states where the corporation need not qualify until just before
the conclusion of the proceedings.
19
For small corporations with uncertain business in the state, the recovery in future
suits will be an insignificant benefit.
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to qualify is raised as a defense.
Most states also impose financial penalties for failing to qualify. A majority of the states make the corporation liable for all
fees and franchise taxes which would have been imposed while
the corporation should have been qualified, as well as penalties
for failure to pay on time. 8° For a corporation which has been
doing business for a number of years, payment of such an accumulated amount may be a substantial hardship even if it could
have paid the fees and taxes on a timely basis. Moreover, a majority of states81 impose a fine on the offending corporation.
•• MBCA § 124 provides:
A foreign corporation which transacts business in the state without a certificate
of authority shall be liable to this State, for the years or parts thereof during
which it transacted business in this State without a certificate of authority, in an
amount equal to all fees and franchise taxes which would have been imposed by
this Act upon such corporation had it duly applied for and received a certificate
of authority to transact business in this State as required by this Act and thereafter filed all reports required by this Act, plus all penalties imposed by this Act
for failure to pay such fees and franchise taxes. The Attorney General shall
bring proceedings to recover all amounts due thil! State under the provisions of
this Section.
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 124. The following states have adopted a similar
provision: ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.696 (Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-124 (West
1956); CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 2203 (Deering Supp. 1980); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-9-103
(1973 & Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-412 (Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 383 (1974) (liability only as a condition of using the courts); D.C. CODE ANN. §· 29934f (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.354 (Harrison 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1421 (1977);
IDAHO CODE § 30-1-124 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1980-81); low A CODE ANN. § 496A.120 (Supp. 1980-81); KY. REv. STAT. § 271A.610 (Supp.
1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:314 (West 1969 & Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
13-A, § 1214 (1974); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-247 (1972); MONT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 15-22117 (1979); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 21-20,121 (1943); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-17-20 (Supp. 1979);
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 1312 (McKinney 1963) (liability only as a condition of using the
courts); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-22-19 (1976); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1703.29 (1978) (liability only as a condition of using the courts); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.201 (West 1951); OR. REV. STAT.§ 57.745 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS§
7-1.1-117 (1969); s.c. CODE § 33-23-150 (1976); s. D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-8-32
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1106 (1979) (also as a condition of using the courts); Tux.
Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18 (Vernon 1956); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 16-10-120 (1953); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2120 (1973); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 23A.32.190 (1969); W. VA.
CODE § 31-1-66 (1975); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-719 (1977).
•• ALA. CODE § 10-2-250 (1975) ($1000); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (Rep!. 1966) (not
less than $1000); CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 2203 (Deering 1947) ($20 per day), § 2258
(Deering 1947) (misdemeanor, $500-$1000); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-9-103 (Supp. 1979) (not
more than $5000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-412 (West Supp. 1980) ($1000); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 378 (1974) ($200-$500 per offense); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-934f (1973)
(not in excess of $500); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.354 (West 1977) ($500-$1000 per year); GA.
CODE ANN. § 22-1801 (1977) ($500 per year); HAW. REv. STAT. § 418-10 (Rep!. 1976) ($100
per 30 days); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (10% of unpaid
fees and taxes); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-11-4 (Burns Supp. 1978) (not more than $10,000);
KY. REV. STAT. § 271A.610 (Supp. 1980) ($250), § 271A.640 ($100-$1000) (Supp. 1980);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:315 (West 1969) ($25-$500 plus $50 per day; $1000 maximum);
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These financial penalties, although not significant to many corporations, 32 may severely affect a small business. 33
Finally, states have adopted a number of additional penalties.
They include fines or imprisonment of agents, servants, or officers,3' imposition of personal liability on officers or agents for
the debts of the corporation,311 denial of the benefit of the statute of limitation, 36 and susceptibility to an injunction forbidding
the further transaction of business in the state. 37 Sanctions imME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1214 (1974) ($25 per day); Mo. CORP. & Ass'Ns CooE
ANN.§ 7-302 (1975) ($200); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 181, § 9 (Michie/Law Co-op 1977) (not
more than $500 per offense per year); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200 (1055) (1974) ($100$1000 per month: 5 year maximum; $10,000 maximum); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 303.20 (West
1969) (not more than $1000, plus $100 per month after assessment and before compliance); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.635 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (not less than $1000); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 80.210 (1979) (not less than $500); N.H. REV. STAT. § 300:7 (1977), § 651:2 (1974)
(felony; not more than $50,000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A-13-11 (West 1969) ($200-$1000
per year; 5 year maximum); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-17-20 (1978) ($200); N.C. GEN. STAT.§
55-154 (1975) ($500 plus costs); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.29 (Page 1978) ($250 plus
15% of unpaid fees and taxes as a condition of using the courts); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 1.201 (West 1953) (10% of unpaid fees and taxes); S.C. CooE § 33-23-150 (1977)
($10 per day); TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18 (Vernon 1980) ($100-$5000 per
month); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.24.040, 9.92.020 (1979) (gross misdemeanor; not
more than $1000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.847 (West Supp. 1979) (50% of unpaid fees and
taxes); Wvo. STAT. § 17-1-719 (1977) ($500).
•• Fines can be moderate. See State v. Bull Inv. Group, Inc., 32 Conn. Supp. 279, 351
A.2d 879 (1974) ($500); State v. Guy Mobil Home Corp., 149 S.E.2d 913 (S.C. 1966) ($10
per day for 61 days).
•• See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 300:7 (1977), § 651:2 (1974) ($50,000); TEx. Bus. CoRP.
ACT ANN. art. 8.18 (Vernon 1980) ($5000 per month) .
.. ALA. CODE § 10-2-254 (Rep!. 1981) (misdemeanor; $100-$1000 and/or imprisonment
in county jail or hard labor for county for not more than 12 months); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
64-1204 (1980) (misdemeanor; $100-$1000 per day); CAL. CORP. CooE ANN. § 2259 (Deering 1977) (misdemeanor; $25-$300); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-9-103 (Supp. 1979) (civil penalty; not more than $1000); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 378 (1974) (fine: $100-$500); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 418-10 (1976) (forfeiture; $100); IND. CooE ANN. § 23-1-11-14 (Burns Supp.
1978) (Class C infraction); Kv. REV. STAT. § 271A.640 (Supp. 1980) (fine; $100-$1000);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:315 (West 1969) (fine; $25-$500, or 3 days - 4 months imprisonment for non-payment); Mo. CoRP. & Ass'Ns CooE ANN. § 7-302 (1975) (misdemeanor;
not more than $1000); NEV. REV. STAT. § 80.210 (1979) (fine; not less than $500); OHIO
REv. CooE ANN. §§ 1703.30, 1703.99 (Page 1978) (4th degree misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1.201 (West 1953) (misdemeanor; not more than $1000 and/or not more
than 30 days imprisonment); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.994 (1979) (fine; not more than $200
and/or not more than 30 days imprisonment); VA. CooE § 13.1-119 (1978) (penalty; $100$1000) .
.. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1216 (Supp. 1979); VA. CooE § 13.1-119 (Supp. 1980). In the
absence of a statute imposing liability, the courts will not do so. See, e.g., Medley
Harwoods, Inc. v. Novy, 346 So.2d 1224 (Fla. App. 1977). But see Gilham Advertising
Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163 (Utah 1977) (imposing liability).
"" HAW. REv. STAT. § 418-13 (Supp. 1979); NEv. REv. STAT. § 80.220 (1979). This sanction may be imposed in the absence of a statutory provision. Weishaar v. Butters Pump
& Equip. Co., 89 P.2d 864 (Kan. 1939).
07
ARlz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-124 (1956); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-9-103 (Supp. 1979);
DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 384 (1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-11-14 (Burns Supp. 1980);
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posed on corporate officers for failure to qualify can be unduly
harsh in relation to the nature of the offense. 88 The injunction
penalty is also unnecessarily severe because of the possibility
that a court may permanently enjoin the corporation from engaging in business in the state. 89

B.

The Qualification Quandary

In spite of the widespread adoption of the MBCA,' 0 states
have developed numerous definitions of "doing business" for
qualification purposes. Although a majority of the states have a
statutory definition of "doing business" which is modeled after
MBCA Section 106, few have adopted the provision without altering the safe harbor list of activities which do not constitute
"doing business. " 0 Where statutes do not contain such a safe
harbor, or where the business conduct at issue is not listed, the
courts create further differences in interpreting the words "doing business."' 2 Definitions of "doing business," moreover, are
based upon the type or nature of corporate activities.' 8 Inherent
vagueness plagues such definitions because of the infinite variations in the nature and types of business activities. Indeed, very
few foreign corporations carry on identical activities within a
given state. Since the question of whether a corporation conducts business within a state represents primarily a question of
STAT. ANN. § 17-7308 (Supp. 1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1211 (Supp.
1980); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 181, § 9 (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1980); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN.§ 300:7 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-12 (West Supp. 1980); S.C. Coos§
33-23-120 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2120 (Supp. 1980).
88
In Arkansas, an officer may be subject to a fine ranging from $100 to $1000 per day.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1204 (Supp. 1979).
18
Cf. Wier v. Fairfield Galleries, Inc., 377 A.2d 28 (Del Ch. 1977) (denial of motion to
dismiss in an action to permanently enjoin a corporation which was engaged in auction
sales of jewelry).
•• See note 10 supra.
" See note 9 supra.
•• For example, courts treat. differently the purchase and acceptance of merchandise
within a state. Compare Sunlight Produce Co. v. State, 183 Ark. 64, 35 S.W.2d 342
(1931) and State v. Pioneer Creamery Co., 211 Mo. App. 116, 245 S.W. 361 (1922) (qualification required) with Stafford-Higgens Indus. Inc. v. Gaystone Fabrics, Inc., 300 F.
Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) and Humboldt Foods, Inc. v. Massey, 297 F. Supp. 236 (N.D.
Miss. 1968) (qualification not required).
•• MBCA § 106 lists ten types of activities. The nature of business activities controls
qualification: (1) the activities must constitute some substantial portion of the corporation's ordinary corporate business; (2) the activities must reflect an intent to carry on its
business in the state; (3) the activities must reflect a continuity of act and purpose; (4)
the determination of whether the activities constitute "doing business" does not depend
upon the success or volume of business; (5) the activities must be actually performed and
not merely authorized. 17 Fum:HER § 8466 (1977).
KAN.
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fact, 44 businesses can draw few firm conclusions from the results
of such case law.
Although the definitions of "doing business" are both numerous and unclear, foreign corporations must nevertheless make
the decision of whether or not to qualify in various states. The
danger created by the present state of affairs is that penalties
may be imposed if the corporation makes an erroneous decision
not to qualify.n A company may find itself suddenly penalized if
inexperienced counsel assumes that conduct insufficient to be
considered "doing business" in one state will be similarly insufficient in another state, even one with identical statutory language. This danger becomes even more pronounced when the decision is made without legal counsel. 48
Frequently, the safest and most efficient method available for
avoiding the risk of sanctions is to register in every state in
which the corporation is engaged in even the slightest business
activity. Corporations often employ such "precautionary" qualification.47 Such a move is undertaken when the expense of making an accurate determination whether to qualify exceeds the
costs of registration. The argument, however, that hardship can
be avoided with precautionary qualification does not justify ambiguous state business regulation. Such an approach condones
the existence of a second de facto standard of "doing business."
This second standard requires less business contact than the
vague present statutory standard, and thus encourages precautionary qualification at a lower level of commercial activity. As a
result, businesses using precautionary qualification must bear
hidden expenses which stem from the inherent ambiguity of the
statutory standards.
Consequently, business executives or their attorneys, in deciding whether to qualify their company as a foreign corporation,
are often in a quandary. They face stiff penalties if they fail to
qualify and qualification turns out to be required; they want to
avoid the needless expense of precautionary qualification; and
they lack standards for making a reasoned decision. One solu•• 17 F'I.ECTCHER § 8464 (1977).
•• Because of the lack of uniformity in the various standards of "doing business," the
corporation's agent is also in danger of reaching the erroneous conclusion that it is appropriate to rely on a previous decision not to qualify in a different state.
•• The problem of an inadvertant failure to qualify is more likely to occur with small
businesses. An attorney who advises a small business not to qualify may give advice
based upon inadequate research when he knows that his client's resources are limited.
47
See CT CORPORATION SvsTEM, WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING Bus1NESS (1976), at vii. See
also Babcock, "Doing Business": The Feasibility of a Statutory Definition, 5 Bus. LAW.
31, 31-32, 40 (1949).
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tion, of course, might be to improve qualification statutes by expanding their list of approved activities. At present, states have
made no attempt to expand substantially the statutory list of
protected activities. 48 Expanding the definition's list, however,
would lessen this statutory vagueness only to a very limited extent. In order to salvage the qualification regime, therefore, some
other means must be found for rectifying the vagueness surrounding MBCA Section 106.

II.

THE JUSTIFICATION AND PURPOSES OF THE PRESENT
SYSTEM

A.

The Doctrine of Conditional Entry as a Historical
Justification

Courts assert that a state has the right to exclude arbitrarily,
or license in any manner, a foreign corporation within its borders, so long as the corporation is not deprived of any constitutional rights. 49 A state may exercise power to exclude or restrict
•• Some states with definitions modeled after MBCA § 106 have added a single type of
activity to the list of ten. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2001 (Purdon Supp. 1979)
(ownership of real property); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-20,105 (1977) (acting in a fiduciary
capacity). The draftsmen of MBCA § 106, however, recognized the impossibility of formulating an exhaustive list of activities not requiring qualification. 2 MooEL Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. 2d § 106, 2d Par. 11 2 (1971) (Official Comment to § 106, 2d Par.).
" Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949). Accord, WHYY v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968) (per curiam). Under the United States Constitution, a foreign corporation is protected by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Southern R.R., v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910). Corporations, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, may not be deprived of liberty or property without due process
of law. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936)(liberty); Minneapolis &
St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889) (property). In addition, the Supreme Court
has applied the protections of the interstate commerce clause to the licensing or qualification of foreign corporations. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961); Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen,
322 U.S. 202 (1944); Furst & Thomas v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493 (1931); Railway Express
Agency v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257
U.S. 282 (1921); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); Buck Stove & Range
Co. v. Vickers, 226 U.S. 205 (1912); International Textbook Co. v. Lynch, 218 U.S. 664
(1910) (per curiam); International Textbook Co. v. Peterson, 218 U.S. 664 (1910) (per
curiam); International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas,
216 U.S. 56 (1910); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Crutcher
v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891); Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727 (1885).
Foreign corporations, however, are not entitled to the privileges and immunities of
citizens under Article IV, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (contrasting corporate "citizenship" for diversity of citizenship
purposes).

Journal of Law Reform

98

[VOL. 14

regardless of motive. 5° Courts have used this position, known as
the "doctrine of conditional entry," as a central justification for
qualification statutes.ai Although courts principally use the doctrine of conditional entry to justify the exercise of state power to
regulate, rather than to exclude, foreign corporations,52 the doc-trine has had ·considerable influence. 53
The doctrine of conditional entry rests on a faulty legal foundation, however, and provides little support for qualification
statutes. Chief Justice Taney's dictum in Bank of Augusta v.
Earle 54 provides the basis for the doctrine: "[A] corporation can
have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty
by which it is created. It exists only in the contemplation of the
law, and by force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. "aa Taney's statement can be disputed because it rests on
both an outdated territorial notion of law and an inaccurate concept of a corporation as a fictional creature of law.ae This doctrine is an anachronism. State qualification requirements should
be justified by something more than this traditional legal
concept.

· B.

The Purposes Served By Qualification Statutes

Qualification statutes may also be justified by functional considerations. The only purposes .which ought to justify the statutes' existence, however, are those purposes not fulfilled by
other _statutory schemes.
1. The jurisdiction function-Most qualification statutes require the appointment of an agent for the service of process. 57
This requirement reflects the state interest in providing a conve00
Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246, 257 (1906).
"' See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 37 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) .
.. A. Conard, Federal Protection of the Free Movement of Corporations in the United
States (November 17, 1978) (unpublished report prepared for discussion at the Conference on Freedom of Interstate Movement in a Federal Community, Bellagio, Italy, July
16-21, 1979; Copyright, University of Michigan) at 11 (asserts that there are no reported
cases of unconditional exclusion).
" See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C. L. REv. 1, 8-10
(1968).
04
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
"Id. at 588.
.. See Walker, supra note 53, at 29-30.
1
•
Statutes typically state that a qualified foreign corporation must appoint a registered agent, and that it is deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State if it fails to
do so. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 113, 115.
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nient forum for its citizens for causes of action arising out of the
acts of foreign corporations. States, however, do not need qualification statutes to obtain jurisdiction over foreign corporations,
since modern long-arm statutes typically provide either for
implied appointment of an agent for service of process in the
state, 118 or for a method of service of process in the foreign
state. 119 The jurisdiction function, then, is largely superfluous,
and not a persuasive ground for qualification statutes.
Arguably, states have an interest in employing the same standard of "doing business" for qualification and jurisdiction pur-"
poses. The states, however, have chosen to establish different
definitions in qualification and long-arm statutes. States often
require less contact with the state for jurisdiction purposes than
for qualification. 60 In these states, the qualifying foreign corporation's appointment of an agent does not extend the jurisdiction of the state beyond that of the long-arm statute.
Qualification statutes may have one important jurisdictional
effect: registered foreign corporations may be subjected to suit
in the state on causes of action arising from activities outside of
the state. In these situations, jurisdiction could not be obtained
under most long-arm statutes, which generally require that the
cause of action arise within the state. 61 States are not forbidden
to assert jurisdiction in causes of action arising outside of the
state. 62 Qualification statutes, however, encourage the expansion
of jurisdiction without the usual judicial analysis of its desirability. 63 The proper inquiry ought to be whether the business done
in the state is "sufficiently substantial and of such a nature" 6 " as
to permit the state to require the corporation to defend a suit.
The state can provide a forum for its citizens through statutes
which deal solely with the question of jurisdiction. The state,
consequently, does not need qualification statutes to extend the
jurisdiction of its courts to foreign corporations and should pur'"
sue other means of doing so.
2. The taxation function-The imposition of franchise taxes
See, e.g., lowA CooE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1980).
•• See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 16 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) .
.., See, e.g., Continental Properties, Inc. v. Ullman Co., 436 F. Supp. 538, 541 (E.D. Va.
1977); Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. Nousis, 366 N.E.2d 38, 42-43 (Mass. 1977); Beltone
Electronics v. Selbst, 58 A.D.2d 560, 560, 396 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1977); Horton v. Richards,
594 P.2d 891, 893 n.3 (Utah 1979).
•• E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) .
.. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
•• See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current Account,'47 N.C. L. REV. 733,
738 (1969) .
.. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
08
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is commonly tied to qualification,811 reflecting the state interest
in taxing foreign corporations which do business in the state. Although the method of computation varies from state to state,
franchise taxes are essentially taxes upon the "privilege of doing
business" in a state. 88 Most importantly, the reporting requirements of these statutes87 provide information to state revenue
authorities. The information also helps in identifying corporations and computing assessments for other state taxes.
These reporting requirements, however, are unnecessary for
two reasons. One reason is that the usefulness of such information in locating corporations is limited: the constitutional level
of minimum contact required for taxation purposes is less than
the standard for qualification,88 and enforcement difficulties occur where contacts are so slight that corporations need not qualify. Another reason is that state tax laws typically impose reporting requirements which are independent of qualification
statutes. 89 While the taxation of foreign corporations is a legitimate state interest, a qualification scheme seems unnecessary to
further it.
3. The protection-through-information function- Qualification statutes provide information for government officials and
individual citizens through reporting requirements. 70 These requirements serve legitimate purposes by allowing the state to (a)
supervise the corporations in order to protect its citizens; (b)
subject foreign corporations to inspection to determine their
condition, standing, and solvency; (c) treat them in the same
manner as domestic corporations with respect to disclosure of
information; and (d) provide evidence of their existence. 71 Unlike the other objectives, the states cannot effectively accomplish
these purposes through other statutory provisions already in
existence.
The foundation of the protection function derives from state's
desire· to protect its citizens from the misconduct of foreign cor•• See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
•• The constitutional limitations on the assessment of "franchise" taxes are the same
as those on other taxes imposed upon interstate commerce. Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977).
07
See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
•• The respective levels of contact actually required for taxation and qualification are
similar. See, e.g., Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v. Sprague, 474 P.2d 201, 203 (Ariz.
App. 1970).
•• Walker, supra note 63, at 746-47.
•• See notes 18-19" supra.
11
2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d §§ 110-112, 11 2 (1971) (Official Comment to §§
110-112).
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porations. A qualification scheme should minimize the number
of situations in which the state's citizens could be harmed by a
foreign corporation deemed not to be "doing business" in the
state. A state legislature, therefore, must weigh against the risk
of corporate misconduct the value of increased business activity
which stems from a less regulated commercial environment. In
MBCA Section 106, the enumerated activities are unlikely to
cause harm to local citizens and are justifiably excluded. 72 The
list of activities, however, is far from complete. While a more
comprehensive statement of safe harbor activities would help,
such an expansion could never provide a business with the certainty needed for making qualification decisions.

Ill.

THE PROPER SOLUTION: ESTABLISH A TEST FOR
"DOING BUSINESS" BASED SOLEL y ON
IN-STATE SALES VOLUME

The present system of state qualification requirements is obviously deficient. These requirements, however, should not be
abolished 73 because they serve one legitimate purpose, as discussed above: furnishing general information about foreign corporations not subject to any other information disclosure
scheme. What is needed is a qualification scheme which incorporates this protection function, but which reduces the amount of
uncertainty involved in the decision whether or not to qualify.
Revising the definition of "transacting business" in the second
paragraph of MBCA Section 10674 would rectify the serious
problems of the present qualification statutes. The new definition would provide that a foreign corporation shall be considered
to be transacting business in a state only if its annual volume of
sales in the state exceeds a specified amount. Each state would
determine the minimum level of sales volume under the statute.
"Sales in the state" should not, however, include sales which do
not reflect a presence in the state of the corporation. Present
qualification statutes have identified three categories which
should be incorporated into the new definition. These sales in11
Of the ten activities enumerated in MBCA § 106, however, two appear to be codifications of constitutional limitations on the application of qualification requirements: See
MBCA §§ 106(0, 106(i), supra note 8; 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 106, 11 4.05
(1971) (annotation of cases establishing constitutional limitations on qualification
requirements).
11
But see Walker, supra note 53, at 30 (suggesting abolition).
14
See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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elude those effected through (a) independent contractors,711 (b)
solicitation or procurement of orders which require acceptance
outside the state before becoming binding contracts,76 or (c) a
subsidiary corporation incorporated or transacting business in
the state. 77
The proposed revision of Section 106 would provide greater
uniformity among state statutes, reduce the vagueness of business regulation, and fulfill the protection-through-information
requirements of the states. First, the revision would make state
qualification requirements more uniform. Present qualification
statutes provide fifty-one different definitions of "doing business" which differ in both statutory language and judicial construction. 78 Although the revision represents model legislation
like the present Section 106, the proposal's simplicity and brevity would greatly increase the likelihood that states would adopt
the provision without modification. Because the states would be
able to establish different sales volume figures, the new system
would not be uniform insofar as the ultimate decision of whether
to qualify would be the same for a given level of activity. The
various sales volume figures, however, would not create the same
type of confusion caused by the present system. Instead, the
qualification decision in all of the states would be uniform in the
sense that the inquiry in each case would turn on one readily
quantifiable factor: the volume of sales in the state. The proposal's simplicity and brevity, therefore, would reduce the necessity for judicial construction, decreasing the possible number of
differences in state standards arising from varying
interpretations.
Second, the revision would clarify the definition of "doing
business." The various current definitons of "doing buisness"
are vague. 79 The suggested solution is not a futile attempt to
clarify the inherent vagueness of the present version of MBCA
Section 106 by expanding the list of exempted business activities. Rather than defining "doing business" in terms of the type
or nature of activity, the proposal utilizes a definition capable of
objective determination. The proposal does not describe conduct
which does not constitute "doing business"; rather, the proposal's definition avoids the problems of vagueness inherent in a
70
See MBCA § 106(e), supra note 8.
•• See MBCA § 106(0, supra note 8.
77
See CAL. CORP. CooE ANN. § 2105 (Deering Supp. 1980); GA. Coo& ANN. § 22-1401

(1977); S.C. CooE § 33-23-10 (1976).
•• See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
•• See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
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"negative" and nonexclusive definition like MBCA Section 106.80
Third, the revision satisfies the protection function of qualification statutes. 81 The protection function is satisfied if the foreign corporations exempted from registration requirements are
not likely to engage in conduct harmful to the state's citizens.
Rather than attempting to enumerate all activities which are unlikely to result in such injury, the suggested solution exempts
from qualification foreign corporations whose sales in the state
do not exceed a certain level. In general, as sales volume increases, so does the level of contact with the state's citizens.
Thus, a legislature can establish the acceptable level of risk of
harm to its citizens from unqualified foreign corporations. Activities which create risks of harm unrelated to the level of sales
volume, such as securities transactions, should be regulated with
specific legislation directed at the particular activities. 82
In deciding what volume of sales would constitute "doing business," state legislatures would make a judgment as to the point
at which the level of contact, as reflected in sales figures, warrants qualification. The volume of sales, however, also provides a
rough indication of the size of a corporation's operations in the
state. Thus, the legislatures could also weigh the benefits which
flow to its citizenry from the activity of a number of small business operations which might not exist if required to qualify. For
example, a legislature especially concerned about "fly-by-night"
entrepreneurs, and less concerned about attracting small businesses to the state, could mandate qualification when annual
sales in the state exceeded $1000. By contrast, a legislature not
convinced that unregistered foreign corporations presented a significant threat, or more concerned with attracting new businesses, might require registration only when the annual sales in
the state exceeded $100,000. In summary, the proposal better
provides the state legislature with the opportunity to make an
effective cost-benefit analysis when determining which corporations should register.
CONCLUSION

The present system of state qualification requirements has
"' See Babcock, supra note 47. The author advocates that "doing business" be defined
by statute in affirmative and exclusive terms. Id. at 38-39.
01
See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
•• See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§§ 1-101 to -704 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (Pennsylvania
blue sky law).
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significant weaknesses. A multiplicity of "doing business" definitions exist, coupled with an unacceptable degree of vagueness in
those definitions. The resulting uncertainty makes most decisions not to qualify in a state risky. As a result, many foreign
corporations are forced to qualify without regard to whether
they are actually "doing business." Qualification requirements
serve the legitimate purpose of gathering the information necessary to protect a state's citizens. The present system, however,
must be modified in order to correct its deficiencies.
A change in the MBCA definition of "transacting business" is
required. The new definition should abandon the previous attempts to define "doing business" in terms of the type or nature
of the conduct. Instead, the definition should be formulated in
terms of the volume of sales in a state. This definition would be
simple and susceptible to objective measurement. It would provide uniformity and clarity, while allowing qualification schemes
to serve proper state interests. Without this new definition, the
very legitimacy of state qualification requirements for foreign
corporations remains uncertain.

-Stanley M. Klem

